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Related Parties: Audit Risk When 63 Entities Act As One
INTRODUCTION
With heightened awareness that fraudulent financial reporting may be more prevalent than ever
expected after globally damaging scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, Adelphia Communications
emerged from the year 2001 seemingly unscathed. Despite an unqualified audit report from one of the
world’s most dominant public accounting firms, Adelphia had fraudulent activity pouring from almost
every operational aspect of the company. Seemingly standing tall as the then sixth-largest cable company
with operations in over 32 states and Puerto Rico, the then soon to be scandal would be about more than
refusing to disclose subsidiary debt on consolidated financial statements (Barlaup, Dronen, & Stuart,
2009). Far worse, the root of a $2.6 billion debt concealment, falsified earnings, and fictional operational
statistics began and ended with a family corrupted by a desire for frivolous spending furnished by
seemingly endless company cash reserves rationalized with promises of repayment (Johnson & Rudolph,
2007). Much like the Rigas family’s later attempts at emotional retribution, these initial promises of
repayment were nothing but empty. Although it would be easy to place blame on a family clearly
involved in precarious practices, shareholders, as well as the SEC, believed the issue infiltrated well
beyond the company and rooted itself into the heart of one of the nation’s forefront public accounting
firms, Deloitte.
COMPANY BACKGROUND
For John Rigas, family and business were never separately compartmentalized affairs. Adelphia,
Greek for adelphos, meaning brother, began innocently enough with John Rigas and two partners. Rigas
later bought out the partners and expanded the venture along with his brother Gus, purchasing cable
systems as early as 1952 across the country on the foundation of heavy loans (Grover & Lowry, 2002).
For 34 years, the Rigas’ carried out operations solely as a family affair before choosing to reorganize five
cable television ventures and create the publicly traded corporation, Adelphia Communications (Barlaup
et al., 2009). In 2001, the idea of a “family environment” was still a focal point with Rigas family
members involved in numerous upper-level executive positions throughout the company. Rigas sat as the
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head of the board of directors, which also featured his three sons and son-in-law as dominant decision
makers destined to decide the company’s ill-seated fate (Grover & Lowry, 2002). The Rigas family
owned or vastly controlled some 63 other entities including various partnerships, corporations, and
limited liability companies. Although some were within the realm of cable television providers, 49 of
these other Rigas entities involved widely differentiated interests such as the Buffalo Sabres hockey
franchise, film production studios, and Christmas tree farming outfits (Johnson & Rudolph, 2007). Family
ties ran even deeper with Adelphia renting trucks, equipment, and even its office headquarters from
various Rigas entities until as recently as 2000 (Grover & Lowry, 2002).
In further investigation as to the root of the initial fraud, many pinpoint a two-year span of mass
acquisitions designed to help Adelphia adequately stay on par with its competitors as the final piece
needed to spur the company towards cataclysmic ruination. From early 1999 to the end of 2000, Adelphia
paved its road to destruction by amassing over $12.6 billion in debt. With new holdings that radically
doubled the size of the company, its total liabilities skyrocketed 3.6 times from the once potentially
manageable $3.5 billion (Johnson & Rudolph, 2007). Although Adelphia’s co-borrowing debt listings
should have appeared on consolidated financial statements at over $2.6 billion, the financial health of the
company appeared strong with the reassurance of its aggressive, risk-taking founder continuing to
maintain the Rigas standard of an opulently lavish lifestyle. This continuation of such a lifestyle seemed
to give the appearance that the company was experiencing growth and prosperity; otherwise, the family
would have understandably changed their habits had the financial status not been as positive. Despite such
an upward spike of corporate debt financing, Adelphia financial statements still reassured investors, and
Wall Street, of over $2.9 billion in revenue in 2001 alone, furnished by over 5,547,690 subscribers.
Investors would soon find that the company’s revenues were also fraudulently inflated to help maintain
the appearance of success set forth by a family willing to spend so freely on the company’s dime (Barlaup
et al., 2009).
ADELPHIA’S FRAUD
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In the initial SEC complaint against Adelphia, the company’s vast fraud is outlined in harrowing
details that include, “Systematic and fraudulent exclusion of billions of dollars in liabilities from its
consolidated financial statements,…inflated earnings to meet Wall Street expectations, falsified
operations statistics, and concealed blatant self-dealing by…the Rigas family,” (The SEC, 2002).
Regardless of whether the details of the fraud are placed under the microscope of standards today or those
of 2002 when the fraud became public knowledge, every single aspect on its own is a blatant disregard for
the very foundations upon which truthful and accurate financial reporting stand. On March 27, 2002,
Adelphia publically revealed the first of many financial reporting faux pas in its myriad of deceptive and
outright illegal activities. The company confessed to concealing $2.6 billion in liabilities over the course
of 1999-2001 (Johnson & Rudolph, 2007). Coming as a surprise to none, Adelphia stock values
plummeted over 46% in the month immediately following the company’s disclosure. The news of such
deception is never well received, but especially when accompanied by the knowledge that the $2.6 billion
originated through Adelphia’s co-signing of loans for other Rigas family entities unrelated to the parent
company’s interests (Grover & Lowry, 2002).
Heavily pressured to produce revenues within the realm of its top-producing competitors,
Adelphia’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) was grossly inflated,
largely through sham transactions with Rigas family entities that aided in increasing revenues through
creation of fake intercompany receivables for the parent company. The falsified transactions were not
without fabricated corporate documents (Johnson & Rudolph, 2007) originating from upper-level
executives including Vice President of Finance, James Brown and Vice President/Assistant Treasurer,
Michael Mulcahey, who were also included in the SEC case against the Rigas family (“Lit release
17627”, 2002). Expenses including every-day service calls were capitalized instead of being treated as the
ordinary expenses that they were, thus changing the outlook of Adelphia’s financial statements to reflect
inflated revenues because of improper expense treatments (Leonard et al., 2002).
In order to appease Wall Street even more, operational statistics including efficiency and profit
ratios were altered to elude the appearance of more successful operations than what actually existed. In
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testimony at trial, Brown relayed how fabrication and lying quickly became a part of Adelphia’s corporate
culture dating as far back as to its first days a publically listed company. He also conveyed the extreme
measures the company underwent to maintain its fraudulent ways, admitting that “two sets of books, one
showing the reports that Adelphia made to its lenders, and the other identifying what statistics had been
manipulated,” were kept for over ten years (Barlaup et al., 2009). Adelphia was also found guilty of
falsifying its total number of basic cable subscribers by erroneously including those who received various
other services such as high-speed internet and security systems. Although this number totaled only 1.1%
or 60,000 of the company’s subscribers, the goal of masking Adelphia’s true financial nature and
performance was easily achieved through such a thick web of deceit (Solomon, Frank, & Markon, 2002).
Not So Consolidated Financials
Such a danger always exists when parent companies involve subsidiaries in inter-company
transactions, with Adelphia raising more than one red flag during its tumultuous financial mogul tenure.
The concealment of $2.6 billion of parent debt shielded from financial statements began with Adelphia
subsidiaries and Rigas entities entering into co-borrowing agreements from various lenders, with each
borrower individually given access to up to the entire agreement amount of available credit. Although
each entity was mutually and independently liable for the sum of all debt, Adelphia chose to use these coborrowing agreements to its advantage. Being the parent company, Adelphia is required under generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to include any subsidiary debt by various Rigas family entities as
a part of the parent company’s consolidated debt (Johnson & Rudolph, 2007). Management of public
companies is charged with preparing financial statements that fairly and accurately reflect the financial
standing of the company’s accounts, an important standard that the Rigas family failed to uphold with
Adelphia statement filings (The AICPA, 2006). Not only did the debt of its subsidiaries fail to appear as a
part of the parent company’s total liabilities, but the Rigas family further manipulated the consolidated
financial statement system by using its subsidiaries to its outright illegal advantage. The $2.6 billion
liability carrying value on Adelphia’s books quickly dwindled as the company appeared to be paying off
its debt in a timely manner. Rather than actually paying off its debts, Adelphia transferred debt from its
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books and reclassified varying amounts on to the financials of its subsidiaries through a system of endless
journal entries that were conveniently difficult to follow. Because Adelphia and its subsidiaries were coborrowers, the debts should have appeared on the parent company’s books as well because it assumes
debts of its subsidiaries when consolidated financial statements are produced. Adelphia’s blatant
disregard for reporting standards thus caused its subsidiaries to perform the same practices to maintain the
vast system of fraudulent journal entries from their side of the transactions.
The true nature behind reclassifications of such vast amounts of debt originated through “a single
quarterly cash management reconciliation of the inter-company receivables and payables…between
Adelphia, its subsidiaries, and Rigas entities,” (Johnson & Rudolph, 2007). The corporation’s cash
management system (CMS) was easily accessible with no monetary limit in place, frequently being used
as a system of endless cash flow. The debt was assumed by Rigas enterprises by use of the quarterly
reconciliations, achieving reclassification through fraudulent journal entries. The endless trail between
parent, subsidiaries, and other Rigas entities made it impossible to tie-down and accurately determine the
drawdown of loans pertained to each specific entity carrying the liability on its books. Adelphia helped
the cause further by writing off the debts to its subsidiaries, thus championing the “out of sight, out of
mind principal,” allowing the co-borrowing involvements to be all but forgotten from the parent
company’s perspective. Adelphia attempted to shield itself from investigation into the disappearing debt
by providing footnote disclosures on the consolidated financial statements alluding to the inclusion of
Rigas entity debts appearing in Adelphia’s liability accounts. This inclusion led to millions of investors
feeling comfortable with the company’s activities because they lacked knowledge of what was truly
taking place.
Self-Dealing Damage
While Adelphia was seemingly paying off its debts, unbeknownst to most through use of its
CMS, the Rigas family continued to damage the financials and ethical integrity of the company and the
interrelated entities. Because of its centralized nature, the CMS was the ultimate causation of the fraud.
The system acted as a joint holding account for Adelphia, its subsidiaries, and other Rigas family
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operations, allowing family members within each company unlimited access as authorized personnel. The
limit on deposits and withdrawals was nonexistent, and this suited the Rigas’ quest to use the companies
for their own personal gain. Cash flowed freely into the system from credit drawdowns available through
the co-borrowings of parent and subsidiaries, unrecorded and virtually nonexistent to any outside party
(Johnson & Rudolph, 2007). Because of the lack of monitoring and need to rationalize every dollar that
entered and exited the system, the CMS soon became a “personal piggy bank” for members of the Rigas
family. Through its acquisitions of enterprises in widely varying industries, along with tastes for
extravagant living and frivolous ventures, the Rigas family had amassed over $241 million in personal
debt. With family members having unlimited access to the CMS, this personal debt was effectively paid
off over the course of several years with countless transfers of millions of dollars to the family members’
own bank accounts. Luxury properties purchased across the United States by Adelphia provided private,
exclusive access for the Rigas family to get away from corporate operations in Coudersport, Pennsylvania
to places such as Colorado, New Mexico, and New York. Used to a private, lavish lifestyle, John Rigas
utilized $12.8 million in company funds to build an elaborate golf course and clubhouse on private
property controlled by the family (“Personal piggy bank”, 2002). Rigas would later claim the golf course
was built with every intention of fostering improved public relations as well as offering public use
(Barlaup et al., 2009).
When the Rigas family made these withdrawals, none were publically disclosed at the time of
transaction, nor was it common knowledge among Adelphia’s board of directors, except to those Rigas
family members sitting on the board who were privy to such actions (Johnson & Rudolph, 2007). The
company also issued notes and stock totaling over $1.3 billion for the direct benefit of the Rigas family
(“Personal piggy bank”, 2002). Continually concerned with capitalizing from the company’s healthy Wall
Street returns, Rigas family members used millions from the CMS to purchase company securities, albeit
the public was led to believe these capital purchases were supposedly made with personal funds. The
most glaring issue in the Rigas’ unlimited access to what should have been off-limit funds is the absence
of any contractual obligation to repay the withdrawn monies. There existed a complete lack of financial

Related Parties and Audit Risk

7

solvency by any family member. Even if a repayment plan had existed, the family's insolvency would
have prevented any such system from being effective (Johnson & Rudolph, 2007). All of this culminated
into what would be at the time “one of the most extensive financial frauds ever to take place at a public
company,” (“Lit release 17627”, 2002).
Cable Industry Powerhouse No More
Beginning with the March 27, 2002, revelation of the concealment of $2.6 billion in corporate
debt, Adelphia and its Rigas family counterparts quickly fell from the position of one of the top power
players within the cable industry. Financial statements released for fiscal year 2001 included the footnote
about Adelphia’s co-borrowing debts that led to further investigation into its financial dealings, claiming
that the company was liable for loans to the Rigas family not found on the parent’s balance sheet
(Leonard et al., 2002). These co-borrowings had been written off to the company’s subsidiaries and
various Rigas entities through the system of fraudulent journal entries, which is why the co-borrowing
debt did not appear on Adelphia’s financial statements. Coupled with the footnote fiasco was the filing of
Adelphia’s subsidiary, Adelphia Business Solutions, for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on March 27 as well. The
company would further hamper its clean image by notifying the public it would delay filing of annual
reports with the SEC. At the time, the newly recent discovery of Enron’s off-balance-sheet debt dealings
and massive fraud meant even just a simple footnote disclosure lacking a thorough explanation would not
be ignored as just a small concern. The combination of issues proved a fatal blow, quickly spurring the
SEC to open an informal inquiry into Adelphia’s accounting procedures on April 2, 2002 (Barlaup et al.,
2009). At this point, John Rigas, Chairman of the Board of Directors and still CEO of Adelphia, released
a string of statements announcing restatement of 1999-2001 earnings. These statements included an
acknowledgement that shareholders and investors were now asking for a more in-depth look into the
strange financial situations barely brought to light within the most recent footnote disclosures (Leonard et
al., 2002). To make matters worse, forensic accountants hired by Adelphia’s independent directors easily
uncovered an $175 million withdrawal had taken place even after the March 27 revelation, which was
supposedly used to cover Rigas family margin loans (“Personal piggy bank”, 2002). By April 16,
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Adelphia missed the second filing deadline for its annual report, spurred by heated disagreements
between Adelphia and its auditor, Deloitte. Not long after the SEC investigation began, Rigas stepped
down as CEO and Chairman on May 15, with his sons following suit only a few days later (“Lit release
17627”, 2002). Adelphia’s reign as a cable industry mogul came to an end when the company officially
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on June 25, having finally purged its operations of the Rigas
family, but unfortunately not its accounting records (Barlaup et al., 2009).
Deloitte’s Nightmare
Auditing of any public company can prove difficult with the audit draining time, money, and
resources, even if fraud is not found. For Deloitte, the difficulty in auditing a high profile client was not a
sudden development. The firm struggled for years with the Rigas family and the mess of financial
statements the family’s actions created, often causing disagreements between Deloitte auditors and
Adelphia officials over the company’s refusal to disclose information to the public regarding its coborrowing agreements (Barlaup et al., 2009). During the audit of fiscal year 2000, Deloitte urged
Adelphia to disclose a co-borrowing footnote. This footnote disclosure did not appear until the following
year, and would spark the beginning to the end of the Rigas family’s corrupt ways. When the company
refused to include the footnote on its co-borrowings on fiscal year 2000 consolidated financial statements,
the accounting firm surrendered to management’s arguments that the disclosure was unnecessary (Barlaup
et al., 2009). An auditor’s mission is to protect the interests of shareholders and other third-party members
from falsified or misleading financial statements and to provide reasonable assurance that there are no
material misstatements. By acquiescing to management rifled with Rigas family members, Deloitte’s
auditors did not properly perform its audit of Adelphia’s financial statements, and thus failed as
accounting professionals.
During the course of an engagement, auditors should be looking to continually communicate with
those charged with governance, but in the case of Adelphia, the firm was met with Rigas family members
determined to keep fraudulent practices from reaching public light. Corrupt son and financial director Tim
Rigas made up one of a few members of an audit committee that failed to meet more than once during
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1999 and still only a paltry four times during 2000. Research by Barlaup, Dronen, and Stuart (2009)
provides that audit committees of most other companies similar in size to Adelphia met an average of at
least eight to nine times per year, further shedding light on the company’s management and corporate
governance flaws. A potential financial reporting ally for Deloitte in Adelphia’s audit committee was all
but nonexistent when during the final months of 2000 and through April 2001, the committee consisted of
only Tim Rigas and one other outside director. Once the SEC began to indict Rigas family members in
September of 2002, Adelphia began to take up any means of defense that could turn even the slightest
shred of guilt on anyone but its owners, which is why Deloitte soon found itself becoming the focal point
of numerous negligence allegations by a now disgraced family (Barlaup et al., 2009).
The Blame Game Begins
When major financial fraud occurs, many often wonder who is to blame, and just how far blame
should extend. In the case of Adelphia and Deloitte, each party fully believed the other to be the one
solely at fault. Adelphia was split between two feuding parties, the Rigas family, and the independent
directors that had arranged for the Rigas family’s dismissal. An article by Leonard et al. (2002) states the
directors’ belief that Deloitte should have “blown the whistle years ago,” while Deloitte claimed, “the
directors should have had better oversight.” Both parties, however, could ascertain the high degree with
which the Rigas family had corrupted the accounting processes and financial reporting of the company
(Leonard et al., 2002). Allegations for who could be at fault heightened during the months leading up to
the September indictment of Rigas family members after Deloitte was fired as Adelphia’s auditor in late
June, with PricewaterhouseCoopers taking over as the retained auditing firm (“Deloitte”, 2002). The SEC
opened an investigation into whether or not Deloitte aided Adelphia in its fraud for fiscal year 2000. At
that time, the accounting firm, in regards to Adelphia’s financial statements, had released an unqualified
audit report, and the two lead auditors for the engagement team, Gregory Dearlove and William Caswell,
signed off on the report, approving of an audit report so glaringly overlooking numerous elements of
fraud (Meland, 2005).
Deloitte’s Rebuttal

Related Parties and Audit Risk

10

The SEC did indict Deloitte on the grounds of auditor negligence that led to the continued coverup of Adelphia’s massive fraud perpetration. Even before investigations began, Deloitte notified the SEC
after the firm’s dismissal that six Adelphia executives who may have been directly involved with the
fraudulent activities were still employed by the company. From the moment of dismissal, Deloitte
championed a defense based on the grounds that Adelphia willingly withheld vital financial information
from the auditors, which led to an unrealistic picture of the company’s financials. Deloitte’s auditors had
been asked in prior years to audit financial reports that would help the company garner monetary support
from more creditors. In practice, requesting an audit such as this would not have been an issue. In this
case, the firm points out the company’s clear intention to have these reports processed and approved
without supplying Deloitte with enough information to provide a clean audit opinion (Cooke, 2002). In
Deloitte’s defense that it held no knowledge of the fraud prior to 2002, the firm claimed that the first sign
of any fraud came to light only as early as February 2002. In the firm’s dismissal letter, they outline the
recent uncovering of $700 million in company funds the Rigas family used to purchase Adelphia
securities. Deloitte claims they were firm in insisting the Rigas family bring these transactions to the
attention of the audit committee (Grover, 2002). Whether this matter would have raised any issue is hard
to discern, seeing as how at the time, Tim Rigas still sat on the audit committee and exercised
domineering control over what should have been an unbiased panel.
Despite Deloitte’s best efforts to present a defense centered around non-negligent performance on
its part, The SEC ruled otherwise. Over the course of 2005-2007, Deloitte would reach three settlements
in class-action lawsuits. The firm’s settlement with the SEC was the first in a wave of multi-million dollar
financial agreements, with this payout totaling $50 million. The settlement was to be split equally
between a court approved penalty and settlement of the administrative proceedings (“Deloitte reaches
record settlement”, 2005). Deloitte would eventually pay out a total $427.5 million to the SEC, Adelphia
investors, and 38 of Adelphia’s creditors (“Deloitte settles with Adelphia”, 2007). A common theme
existed between rulings in each of the settlements, with an order by the SEC stating the true issues at the
core of Deloitte’s negligence as “engaging in improper professional conduct…and failing to implement
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audit procedures designed to detect the Adelphia fraud.” Director of the SEC’s Northeast Regional office
Michael Schonfeld explains further the glaring concerns of Deloitte’s negligence, stating, “What is
especially troubling here is that Deloitte recognized the risk of fraud posed by this client at the outset.
When auditors turn a blind eye toward misconduct on a high-risk client and allow a fraud of this
magnitude to go undetected, the consequences will be severe,” (“SEC charges Deloitte”, 2005). As
Schonfeld believed, the consequences were quite severe, and in conjunction with millions in settlement
payments, Deloitte agreed to adopt requirements that audit planning become more extensive, involving
forensic accountants and taking extra precautions on such high-risk clients. These extra precautionary
measures would be monitored for compliance by an independent consultant to ensure the changes were
truly taking effect (“Deloitte reaches record settlement”, 2005).
Applying Audit Risk Guidelines: Then and Now
In today’s setting, auditors adhere to numerous guidelines and professional conduct requirements
from the inception of the planning phase to the approval of the final audit report. Deloitte did make
several grievous errors, but an argument could be made it was partly because professional audit standards
were not up to par with where standards are today. For example, Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS)
95, which outlines the ten key Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) that auditors must live
and die by today, did not take effect until the audits of financial statements beginning December 2001,
after Deloitte completed the fiscal year 2000 audit (“Generally accepted auditing standards”, 2001).
Included in SAS 95 are standards outlining the importance of exercising due professional care, achieving
an understanding of the entity and its environment, and properly planning the work going into the audit.
SAS 45 on the other hand had long been in effect to lend guidance regarding related party
transactions, which were highly evident in Adelphia’s business scheme, even if some actions by the Rigas
family were hidden from the auditors. Section .11 describes the extreme importance that an auditor has
sufficient and appropriate evidence to support every possible related party transaction in order to
determine if those transactions have been properly disclosed within the financial statements (“Related
parties”, 1976). Although Deloitte suggested Adelphia disclose information regarding the company’s co-
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borrowing agreements that also involved several of its subsidiaries, the firm failed to carry out the
standard set in SAS 45 when the company refused to disclose such transactions and Deloitte surrendered
to their suggestion (Barlaup et al., 2009). An AICPA released publication interpreting SAS 45 (1979) also
describes the process auditors should undergo when related party transactions are believed to be material,
stating that other auditors for the related entities should be contacted with information being shared on
both sides about the nature of the related parties and their interactions. In this case, Deloitte was the
auditor for Adelphia, several of its largest subsidiaries, and other Rigas family entities (Cooke, 2002).
Audit standards stress the importance of proper planning and adequate training, especially when
faced with high-risk clients. Adelphia, with its various subsidiaries and Rigas family entities, matched
with vast amounts of acquisition debt, proved an extremely high-risk client. The very basis of audit risk is
the idea that an auditor may unknowingly fail to uncover material misstatements on financial statements.
Deloitte was auditing a company known for shrewd financing deals, hundreds of related party
transactions taking place on a monthly basis, and cutthroat industry competitors, which culminates into
the overall audit and fraud risk of the engagement being extremely high. Although an auditor should
exercise professional skepticism when performing an audit, possible traces of fraud should not be
dismissed. The warning signs Deloitte auditors would have seen on the 2001 fiscal year audit were too
great to have been ignored (“Audit risk and materiality”, 2006). Complex systems of guidelines are
currently in place by numerous accounting oversight bodies such as the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to help
auditors identify warning signs of fraud. With these guidelines, an auditor today could prepare a more indepth plan to assess audit risk and determine if fraud was present than Deloitte could have in 2001 on its
fiscal year 2000 Adelphia audit.
In preparing for an audit with such high levels of risk, all engagement members should be aware
of key financial statement areas that pose higher risk levels. In planning the Adelphia audit, lead auditors
should have noted the potentially high-risk area of related party transactions, taking care to obtain more
evidence of these transactions than what might be necessary for lower-risk transactions and account
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balances. The goal is to then provide reasonable assurance that such transactions are not materially
misstated, but only after adequate evidence has been gathered and tested. Deloitte supposedly faced
roadblocks when trying to obtain enough information to properly evaluate the related party transactions,
specifically the co-borrowing agreements and monthly reconciliations of intercompany receivables and
payables. Because Adelphia management personnel refused to provide the auditors with the evidence and
information it requested for numerous material items, this should have led Deloitte to at least consider the
possibility of issuing a qualified or disclaimer opinion on Adelphia’s financial statements. Client-imposed
scope limitations, especially when management refuses to make changes, provide requested information,
or make proper disclosures, are glaring red flags that should make an auditor stop and question the
integrity of the client’s management and what management may be attempting to hide. The Deloitte
auditors, regardless of what guidelines were in place at the time of the audit, should have taken into
consideration the concerns raised by various material, related-party transactions and management’s
unwillingness to cooperate in investigating for misstatements. Ultimately, the audit should not have
resulted in the issuance of a standard unqualified report.
Reducing Fraud Risk of High-Risk Clients
High-risk clients often incur much higher levels of fraud risk, and can create problems for
auditors and their accounting firms if no actions are made to effectively address such risk. Whether the
firm is looking to acquire a high-risk client for a first time audit, or the company has been a long-term
client, fraud risk should still be assessed before beginning the engagement, throughout the auditing
process, and even after the issuance of an audit report. By reducing fraud risk, auditors can oftentimes
lower their own risk through implementation of procedures that help the client combat environments
where fraud can thrive. For example, a fiscal year-end audit consists of providing reasonable assurance
that the previous year’s financial statements are free from material misstatements. Members of an
engagement team should be acutely aware of management’s integrity, especially in regards to their
willingness to cooperate, and note any issues as a potential sign that fraud could be more prevalent if the
ethics of such people are questionable even from the inception of the audit. The best possible course for

Related Parties and Audit Risk

14

reducing fraud risk on an individual basis can stem from each auditor exercising professional skepticism
throughout the entire process. The goal is not to assume fraud is bound to exist when auditing a high-risk
client, but the notion that the higher levels of risk could entail more difficult accounting procedures that
lend itself to disguising risk more easily should be considered “Audit risk and materiality, 2006).
The AICPA and PCAOB have both put a greater focus on combatting audit and fraud risk in
recent years, including stressing the importance of placing more emphasis on the planning process before
beginning an actual audit. The prospective organizations collectively express a need to “exercise
judgment about…significant risks, considering at least…the complexity of transactions, whether the risk
relates to fraud, and if the risk involves significant transactions with related parties,” (D’Aquila, Capriotti,
Boylan, and O’Keefe, 2010). The assessment of such risk should begin as early as the planning process
with the implementation of various risk assessment programs. Common among large firms from as early
as 2005, Risk Management Programs (RMPs) drastically changed the way firms could assess various
aspects of high-risk clients to determine areas with the greatest levels of fraud risk. After Deloitte settled
in the Adelphia case, it began to implement more tools to assess such risks, creating its Deloitte Radar
(DDAR). The system used public data and quantitative formulas to determine a company’s inherent
susceptibility to financial statement fraud. The firm utilizes this information to categorize its high-risk
clients and include those deemed to have “much greater than normal risk” into the firm’s RMP. Through
this system, additional partners and the engagement team can identify fraud-related factors the client
should mitigate in order to reduce their overall levels of fraud risk. If a client can successfully reduce such
risks, the company will “graduate” from the system and be able to better protect against fraud risk for
future engagements. Deloitte recognizes that “its clients have a significant impact on our reputation as a
public company auditing firm. As a result, risk management procedures are essential in…identifying and
addressing engagement related risks,” (D’Aquila et al., 2010).
The issue in assessing fraud risk is that many firms look to reduce such risks when they begin
planning or within the early stages of the engagement, thus failing to continue such procedures throughout
the entire audit. This can leave a firm even more vulnerable and susceptible to fraud-related risks from
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procedures later on in the audit process that are not properly addressed. Deloitte experienced first-hand
the ramifications of not maintaining risk-review procedures throughout an audit can cause, seeing this
exact issue take place during the Adelphia audit. The SEC ruled that Deloitte only completed a cursory
review of its audit plan and failed to follow-up on the fraud risks identified throughout the planning
process. The ability to maintain strong review processes aids significantly in reducing auditor risk as a
result of effectively lowering fraud risk (D’Aquila et al., 2010).
Oftentimes even though an auditor is highly knowledgeable of audit practices and has sufficient
training, the work of a specialist in the client’s industry itself may be garnered necessary. PCAOB AS
1210 states how an auditor “is not expected to have the expertise of a person trained for or qualified to
engage in the practice of another profession or occupation.” Because various industries involve subjective
matters or complex transactions not common among every business, a specialist could provide valuable
knowledge on industry standardized practices and how they should be treated. It is imperative, however,
to ensure that the industry specialist is independent of the client and the audit firm to ensure that any
advice and empirical findings are free from any bias that could potentially increase a client’s fraud risk
potential. The goal of utilizing a specialist is to mitigate any risk created through inexperience with an
advanced industry’s practices that without an educational background in the field, an auditor could not
have known. By ensuring a client is following industry standards and practices, specialists offer an audit
firm an extra layer of defense against fraud risk that could prove imperative in completing a difficult audit
(The PCAOB, 2015).
The best possible way to decrease fraud risk when auditing a high-risk client includes a
culmination of various practices. No single RMP or independent specialist can effectively mitigate fraud
risk as a stand-alone implementation. A firm achieves better results when multiple safeguards are
combined throughout the entire auditing process. Auditors can see great advantages when fraud risk of a
high-risk client is effectively curbed. When these practices are implemented, auditors can “see a better
return on time expended. Improving risk management heightens the quality of…audit engagement,”
(McDonnell, 2004). The strength of the accounting profession as a whole improves from a greater focus

Related Parties and Audit Risk

16

on increasing the quality of tactics to manage fraud risk of high-risk clients. This spurs an increase in
firm-instilled goals to hold all involved within the audit process accountable for creating and upholding
procedures necessary to improve the quality of the audit through effective decreases in fraud risk.
The Future of Audit Risk
Although auditing is often considered preventative, detective, and corrective when it comes to
accounting errors and fraud alike, changes in auditing standards have a tendency to be preventative only
after massive fraud comes to light. The current lack of guidelines that could potentially have prevented
material misstatements due to fraud is often going unnoticed. In order to encourage the placement of early
prevention adaptations to audit standards, organizations like the AICPA utilize exposure draft concepts
that allow public discussion and commentary from those within the audit field themselves. By allowing
auditors and other accounting professionals to work on developing new standards, the structure of
guidelines can become a system of early prevention that matches the exponential growth of future clients,
fueled by the knowledge of auditors themselves. The future of combatting audit risk and truly protecting
all those invested within a client comes through the ability to recognize the need to constantly adapt and
adjust guidelines, allowing those with the situational experience to improve the standards he or she should
strive to uphold throughout the process of any engagement.
Conclusion
When presented with high-risk clients, it oftentimes is difficult to ascertain the proper way to
approach an audit, which in the case of auditing Adelphia’s financial statements, audit risk loomed high
throughout the entire process. The need for adequate evidence in such high-risk situations resonates when
the realization that fraud affects far more than just the company itself, extending beyond to test the very
ethics and professional due care with which an auditor must conduct oneself. Further illustration of the
effects that financial statement fraud can have is evidenced through a recent petition made by John Rigas.
The former owner and CEO of Adelphia is currently serving a fifteen year sentence (Barlaup et al., 2009),
but had petitioned for early release as he is terminally ill and dying of cancer. His petition was denied,
with the district judge stating his bid for early release “failed to raise substantial claims” amidst still
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vigorous contests against his sentencing in the wake of his continuous belief of not having committed
such grievous crimes as to warrant such punishment (Ciotta, 2015). The judge’s ruling displays a nononsense approach to appeasing those involved in committing financial fraud, as she was able to see past
Rigas’ persuasive argument. As professionals, auditors must also be willing to go above management and
owners of a company, especially those making excuses for a barrage of red flags surrounding the
relationship of sixty-three entities surreptitiously acting as one.
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